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The population of eastern Kivu, like that of Rwanda, has been surviving in
critical conditions for many years. The Rwandan refugees of 1994 fled into an
area with its own serious problems. The Zairean health services in the health
districts of Rutshuru, Kirotshe and Masisi, in spite of the political and socio-
economic disintegration of the country, were still functioning, and the local
hospitals and health centres, although overwhelmed, contributed to a large extent
to the disaster response. Prominent among the major problems facing the local
health services were their limited adaptability, the inadequate coordination and
collaboration offered to them by the humanitarian aid agencies, and the
discrimination between the direct and secondary victims of the emergency. The
public health consequences of the Rwandan refugee crisis for the Zairean
population constitute an integral part of the disaster.
Did the humanitarian aid agencies and the local health services in eastern Kivu
collaborate, or rather compete, in response to the Rwandan emergency? To
answer this question, this paper focuses on the zones de scmte of Kirotshe,
Rutshuru and Masisi, where most Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu are
concentrated, and also where the medical team of CEMUBAC is active.
Eastern Kivu and its Population
Lake Kivu, on the border between Zaire and Rwanda, is surrounded by
highlands with a mean altitude of 1700 metres. The climate is temperate. The
O Oxford Univeriity Pros 1996






Humanitarian Aid and Health Services 269
year is divided into the dry season from June to October, and the rainy season,
which is interrupted by a very short dry season—two or three weeks—at the
end of January (Vis et al. 1969).
Population
The indigenous population in eastern Kivu, on the western shore of the lake,
comprises lactose intolerant Shi, Havu, Hunde and Nande tribes; their main
occupation is subsistence farming (Vis et al. 1969).
Emigration from Rwanda to Zaire is a very old phenomenon, the
consequence of recurrent episodes of famine in Rwanda. It was organized by
the Belgian colonial authority, mainly towards Masisi district, where 170,000
Rwandans were recorded in 1955. They were estimated to be 335,000 in eastern
Kivu in 1970. As a consequence, Masisi district, in 1993, was believed to have
650,000 inhabitants, including 400,000 of Rwandan origin, mainly Hutus. In
1993, before the recent influx of refugees, the Hutus were certainly the most
important ethnic group in the health districts of Masisi and Rutshuru—up to
80 per cent of the population in certain areas. Five per cent of the population
were Tutsi-Himas. These traditional lactose tolerant cattle breeders originally
lived in Rwanda, and first emigrated to Kivu because of overpopulation in
Rwanda, but on subsequent occasions, in 1959, 1964, and 1973, for political
reasons. Since the recent influx of refugees, the Tutsi-Himas have been moving
back to Rwanda to escape being murdered by the defeated Hutu extremists.
For some years now ethnic conflicts have also put the Rwandan immigrants
in opposition to the native Zairean populations, Hunde and Nande, who
represent no more than one third of the total population of the Masisi district.
The arrival of 700,000-800,000 supplementary Hutus poses a serious problem
for that part of Zaire.
Population density in Kivu is also high, although lower than in Rwanda. The
population doubles every 20 to 22 years (Vis 1975; Wils et al. 1986). The
population of the Masisi district, for instance, was estimated to be 650,000, or
more than 160 inhabitants per square kilometre. Kabare, a rural area north-
west of Bukavu, has now more than 200 inhabitants per square kilometre.
Food Consumption and Health Status
The rural population lives in a near-subsistence economy (farming or informal
commercial activity) (Jones and Egli 1984) and energy consumption is
chronically insufficient (Vis et al. 1969), varying according to the population
density. Protein intake is likewise marginal in the whole area (Vis et al. 1969).
Significant seasonal variations of protein intake occur, mainly in those areas
where 50 per cent of the protein ingested comes from beans. Protein deficiency
in Kivu cannot be dissociated from energy deficiency.
The energy intake fluctuates less, because sweet potatoes and cassava are
harvested throughout the year. However, overpopulation, soil exhaustion and
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soil erosion constantly reduce the arable surface (Vis 1975), and even
disregarding political and economic difficulties, it can be assumed that the
energy intake of the population is following a downward trend (Wils et al.
1986).
There is evidence that protein and energy deficiencies in Kivu are
accompanied by deficiencies of various micronutrients: vitamins (e.g. ribo-
flavin, nicotinic acid, alpha-tocopherol, vitamin A) as well as minerals (e.g.
iodine and selenium) (Delange 1974; Goyens et al. 1987).
As in most tropical environments, parasitic infestation is massive, occurring
very early in life. More than 90 per cent of the children above two years of age
excrete parasites (IRS-CEMUBAC 1979). Malaria—Plasmodium falciparum—
is endemic (Delacolette et al. 1989). Incidence of bacterial infections (more
particularly acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeal diseases) is extremely
high. Cholera (Colaert et al. 1978) and multi-resistant shigellosis (De Mol et al.
1983; Ries et al. 1994) have been endemic since the late seventies and the early
eighties.
As a consequence of these longstanding problems, relative malnutrition is the
rule, characterized by intra-uterine growth retardation, early post-natal growth
failure and faltering of local growth curves (IRS-CEMUBAC 1979; Tonglet et
al. 1991).
Severe protein-energy malnutrition (PEM) is endemic. Marasmic kwashior-
kor is the most prevalent form, the incidence increasing markedly at the end of
the dry season (Vis 1968). Weaned children aged 2-4 years are the most
vulnerable. However, many younger and older children, up to 10 years of age,
present with clinical signs of severe PEM, as well as some adults, usually
pregnant and lactating mothers.
Food availability in the cities (Bukavu and Goma) is less dependent on the
seasons due to the regulatory effect of the monetary economic system. City
dwellers consumed the same foods as in the rural area, with, however, a higher
proportion of cassava (Vis et al. 1975). Energy and protein intakes were usually
adequate. Due to the worsening of the economic and political situation,
however, it may be supposed that the nutritional situation in the cities is
rapidly deteriorating, so that more and more cases of PEM will appear there
likewise (Tonglet et al. 1991).
The population of eastern Kivu, like the population of Rwanda (Vis 1975;
Vis et al. 1975), has been enduring critical conditions for many years. The
emergency did not just begin in July 1994. Indeed, clashes had already occurred
in April 1993 in Masisi district, killing 5,000-10,000 people and leading to the
displacement of about 165,000. This was the expression of a longstanding
latent conflict between the original population—roughly 20 per cent of the
total—and Rwandan immigrants who had settled in the district since the late
fifties. Native Zaireans have political power, the Rwandan immigrants have the
land. The 1993 conflict was due partly to the worsening conditions of life in
Zaire as the economy and administrative structure were collapsing. But it was
also caused by the recurrent land shortage in a subsistence economy, with
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consequent reduction of food availability and forced emigration, as foreseen by
a dynamic model produced in 1978 (Wils et al. 1986). The Rwandan refugees of
1994 fled into an area with its own serious problems, where, furthermore, a
large part of the population is of Rwandan origin, mostly Hutus.
The Health Services in Zaire
In the early eighties the government of Zaire chose a decentralized and
integrated approach to health care provision. The Zairean health policy is
based on a network of 306 health districts—zones de sante—whose boundaries
have been defined by the pattern of use of existing health facilities rather than
administrative delimitations. One health district was supposed to cater for
100,000 to 200,000 people. The health system operates at two distinct but
complementary levels: the referral hospital, one per district; and several health
centres, each with a catchment area of roughly 10,000 people. The network is
progressively extended, ideally to cover the requirements of the entire
population of the health district.
Each health entity enjoys considerable autonomy in management of daily
activities, but a health district management team—the Bureau Central de
Zone—comprising staff members of the health district at all levels and
delegates elected by the population, headed by the district health officer, plans
the programme, coordinates the activities of the health district and provides
close supervision.
The hospital is staffed by a medical director and assistants, while health
centres are staffed by trained nurses, assisted by auxiliary medico-social staff
members. Local health committees—Comites de Sante—encourage community
participation and are responsible for the maintenance of the local infra-
structure—mainly buildings and furniture.
How is the system financed? In 1993, the gross national product per
inhabitant was estimated to be US$ 225 (World Bank 1993). About 0.5 per cent
of this was spent in health care. Until recently, 2.5 per cent of the national
budget was supposed to be devoted to public health. At the health district level,
in 1989, approximately 5 per cent of expenses were covered by governmental
subsidies. Clearly this is now much less, as the Zairean state is in crisis. The
inhabitants have thus to rely mainly on themselves, and on external support.
The Health Services in Eastern Kivu
The North Kivu region comprises 19 health districts. Since 1985, the three
health districts of Kirotshe, Masisi and Rutshuru, located close to Goma, have
been implementing a comprehensive primary health care programme in
collaboration with CEMUBAC and other organizations. In this programme
the health centre, rather than the referral hospital, is the operational
cornerstone of the system. It is supposed to answer ah1 basic socio-medical
needs in its area. It was some years before the local health committees really
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started working, but some of these are genuinely functioning as committees for
integrated development now, being active in many areas besides health care.
Thanks to staff motivation and the involvement of the population, the three
districts seem to be making progress, in spite of the socio-economic
disintegration of the country, illustrated for instance by an inflation rate of
1320 per cent between November 1993 and January 1995.
The total population of the three districts is over 700,000 people. Fifty-six to
100 per cent of the inhabitants have a health centre within 10 km from home.
While in the Rutshuru district all health centres are operational, this is the case
in only 60 per cent in Kirotshe and Masisi. Fifteen to 30 per cent of the
population presents sick at a health centre at least once per year.
Since 1993, the Masisi health district, which initially was among the best
performing, has had to cope with ethnic conflicts and serious problems of
insecurity, with an obvious impact on its performance.
Since the end of the eighties, CEMUBAC has invested annually approxi-
mately 7 million Belgian francs (US$ 230,000) in the three health districts
together. This amount covers 25 to 50 per cent of the expenses, the rest being
provided by the inhabitants themselves. Thus, the rural health districts cost
under US$ 1 per inhabitant, per year. One episode of illness treated at a health
centre in eastern Kivu costs about US$1.5; referral to a doctor, US$ 5; and
hospitalization US$ 25-50.
Participation in the Rwandan Emergency Relief Effort
Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans crossed the border near Goma between
14 and 17 July 1994. They transformed the city and its neighbourhood into a
huge refugee site. On 19 July, cholera, which is endemic in the area, broke out
and quickly spread. The government of Zaire and the humanitarian agencies
decided that the refugees had to leave the city. As a result, 800,000 refugees
were concentrated in three camps: Kibumba, Mugunga and Katale. Cholera
continued its devastation at these new sites. The epidemic waned, but multi-
resistant shigellosis immediately took over as a major killer (Goma
Epidemiology Group 1995).
An estimated 120,000 to 250,000 refugees settled outside the camps and
mixed with the local population. There are indications that they fared better,
and in particular were less affected by cholera.
More than 18 months later, the refugees were still living in these huge camps.
Mortality was lower than in July and August 1994, and possibly lower than
that of their Zairean neighbours outside the camps.
What was the role of the Zairean health services? We shall concentrate on
those health centres where problems were most acute, and on the first four
months following the refugee influx, when the health system was most in
demand.
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Rutshuru Health District
The Rutshuru health district is located north of Goma, along the main road
passing the camps of Kibumba and Katale. This health district was believed to
be one of the main areas of settlement outside the camps. The number of
refugees residing in the district, outside the camps, between July and October
1994 was estimated at 35,000-80,000, compared with a local population of
214,000 inhabitants. These refugees had settled in 12 of the 14 health areas of
the district, leading to an increase in population ranging from 1.9 to 70 per cent
in the various health areas.
These refugees caused a spectacular rise in workload for the Zairean health
services. According to the health centre reports, the number of curative
consultations, per month, for Zaireans, was approximately the same between
July and September 1994 and during the first six months of the year. But the
total number of curative consultations for the entire district increased by about
300 per cent, ranging from 0 per cent in the Vitshumbi health centre, located in
the Virunga National Park north of Rutshuru, to about 750 per cent at the
Rutshuru health centre.
Between 1 August and 30 September 1994, Rutshuru general hospital
registered an increase of close to 140 per cent in the average monthly use of
services.
In the health centres and the referral hospital of Rutshuru district, during the
first 15 weeks following the influx, some 65,000 new cases were registered
among refugees; it was estimated, in and outside the camps, that 100 new cases
per 10,000 refugees presented themselves each day at a health centre; 65,000
new cases in 15 weeks thus correspond to a refugee population of 62,000.
The weekly epidemiological reports showed that between 18 July and 21
August 1994, 19,707 patients (8,910 cases of diarrhoea, of which 4,111 cases of
bloody diarrhoea, and 10,797 cases with other pathologies) were registered
among the Rwandan refugees in the health centres and hospital of Rutshuru
health district (Porignon et al. 1995). During the same period, 210 deaths
among Rwandan refugees were reported in these health structures, probably a
fraction of the total fatalities.
Refugees were treated completely free of charge in Rubare and Rutshuru
health centres and Rutshuru hospital. Although refugees represented around
one third of the population, they formed two thirds of the patients. The refugee
utilization rate was five and ten times higher than that of Zaireans in Rubare
and Rutshuru respectively. In Rutshuru, Zaireans' fear of infection from
refugees kept them away. The increased workload obliged staff to concentrate
on refugee patients. The laboratory was closed. In Umoja, on the other hand,
where refugees had to pay for health care, few attended, better conditions were
maintained in the health centre and Zairean attendance increased.
The Rutshuru hospital was rapidly overwhelmed by refugees, the occupation
rate being 150 per cent at the end of August, falling to 98 per cent by mid
September. Hospitalizations of Zaireans were reduced by about 30 per cent
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(except in medicine, where indeed many Zalreans with cholera and shigellosis
were admitted as well), due to fear of infection and deterioration in the quality
of care.
The radiologist left the hospital to work for a humanitarian aid agency,
taking with him all the departmental records.
The costs of treating the refugees were only retrieved some months later
from UNHCR. The self-financing capacity of the health centres when refugees
were treated free, was reduced four to five times. As a consequence, salaries,
which are partly paid by the income of the health centre, had to be reduced by
about 50 per cent although the workload increased considerably. Salaries paid
by the humanitarian aid agencies were 2 to 10 times higher than salaries paid in
the area! In such a context, it is surprising and comforting that very few
defections—8 per cent—were observed among the personnel of the health
centres.
Reduced self-financing capacity also affected the general hospital and the
Bureau Central de Zone, which depends on income from the health centres for
about 30 per cent of its expenses. Workload greatly increased, with insufficient
logistical support—equipment, transport facilities, and fuel. Supplementary
expenses of the office were partly reimbursed, later on, by UNHCR. An
employee of the office on mission got US$ 2 per day, an employee of any relief
organization on mission received US$ 25. As a consequence, 25 per cent of staff
members left the office to join the humanitarian aid agencies between the end of
1993 and May 1995!
Kirotshe Health District
The Kirotshe health district, south of Goma, has 319,000 inhabitants. There is
one general hospital. Among the 25 health centres, two larger ones have
hospitalization facilities. Mugunga refugee camp is located in Goma health
district, but very close to Kirotshe. The camp hosts 125,000 refugees, including
many soldiers of the defeated Rwandan army. The number of refugees living
outside the camp is estimated to be 38,000.
Eight health centres had to cope with refugees. The two most in demand
were Sake and Bulenga. The population in these areas, with 13,850 and 14,660
refugees, increased by 58 and 62 per cent, respectively. As far as the health
centres are concerned, the same remarks apply for Kirotshe as for Rutshuru:
increased workload, adequate response capacity with increased curative
activities, but reduced income, self-financing capacity, and preventive medicine
and health promotion activities.
Bulenga health centre is large, with maternity and hospitalization facilities.
Sake is another large health centre, very close to the Mugunga camp. Refugees
in the area represent 40 per cent of the population, but 75 per cent of the
patients. Refugees were treated free; their utilization rate was three to five times
higher than for the Zalreans, whose attendance fell.
Self-financing capacity in Kirotshe was reduced five times.
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Many staff defections were observed in Kirotshe health district. Difficulties
arose because of the complete lack of coordination and collaboration between
the humanitarian aid agencies active in the district area, and the local
authorities, at all levels: health centre, health district, and local administration.
As a consequence, life conditions—infrastructure and environment—of the
local population markedly deteriorated after the refugee influx. Surprisingly,
this did not cause too much antagonism, but there was certainly a loss of
morale and sense of unfairness.
Unlike the Rutshuru situation, Kirotshe hospital did not suffer too much:
numbers of refugees were reasonable. Refugees preferred to be hospitalized in
Goma, easily accessible by road. As a consequence, utilization by the local
population remained stable.
Masisi Health District
Problems were quite different in Masisi. The health district had 268,000
inhabitants in 1993: approximately 20 per cent native Zaireans (Hunde), 5 per
cent Tutsis, and 75 per cent Hutus. In 1994, significant population movements
occurred inside the area; the population was reduced to approximately 200,000
inhabitants. As the majority of the population in 1994 was of Hutu origin, the
area was extremely attractive for the incoming refugees. However, because of
the longstanding conflicts between the native Hundes and the Rwandan
immigrant population, the Zairean authorities decided that the 1994 refugees
should not be allowed to enter the district. The number of refugees, in October
1994, was estimated to be only 12,000. There are no camps in the Masisi district.
Insecurity is the most important problem. Many employees of the health
system left. Quite a number were Tutsis; threatened in Zaire, and attracted by
the new regime in Kigali, many returned to Rwanda. Others joined the relief
organizations. Seven out of the 23 operational health centres closed; three
others no longer function effectively; only 13 are functional. Curative activity
in the health centres is increasing; preventive medicine and health promotion
activities are diminishing. As the people do not dare to travel, because of the
insecurity, the occupation rate of the hospital dropped to 18 per cent in 1994.
The area received some support, characterized by inefficient coordination
and collaboration, due probably to difficult access and lack of precise
information. For instance, a humanitarian aid agency provided some help;
however, the introduction by this organization of free medical care caused a lot
of problems. UNHCR offered no support to the health centres, but on the
contrary, offered support to the hospital, where no single refugee had been
hospitalized!
Response Capacity of the Zairean Health Services
Thus the response capacity of the Zairean health services should not be
overlooked. Although overwhelmed, the local hospitals and health centres
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made an undoubted contribution to the disaster response. Among the factors
which played a role in the resilience of the rural health districts in the
management of the disaster were the district-based organization of the local
health system, the quality and the capacities of the trained medical and
paramedical personnel and the administrators, the process of collegial decision-
making, and the active collaboration offered by the staff members to the relief
organizations.
These observations also suggest that the public health consequences of the
Rwandan refugee crisis for the host population constitute an integral part of
the disaster. Among these consequences, we should mention a decrease in the
quality of care, because of the overload of work and the defection of many
staff members and employees, a decrease or a breakdown in preventive
activities, and a decrease in self-financing capacities which notably means
wage cuts.
The Humanitarian Aid Organizations' Contribution
to the Local Health System
The picture here is varied and generalization is not possible. In some
circumstances, collaboration and coordination were quite satisfactory, in
others not. It appeared clearly that contacts with organizations already active
in north-eastern Kivu before July 1994, including MSF-Holland, UNHCR, the
International Red Cross, Oxfam and Caritas, were much easier than with
organizations without any experience of the area, or without any experience.
Some, among the latter, apparently did not want to communicate at all.
The support offered by the humanitarian aid organizations consisted of
1) financial support, 2) drugs, medical equipment and logistic support, and
3) coordination.
Financial support at the height of the crisis was insufficient and did not cover
the extra effort made at all levels of the local health services to respond to the
disaster. This was extremely discouraging for the personnel, and ironic in view
of the fact that the estimated cost to UNHCR of medical care per refugee
during the 12 months following the influx was roughly 15 times as much as the
per capita cost of local health services.
Drugs and medical equipment were provided in quantity, but frequently did
not correspond to the requirements of the health districts. These supplies were
standard packages designed for an emergency dispensary in a camp, rather
than a health centre or an inpatient hospital with obstetric and surgical wards.
Support here was thus quantitatively adequate, but qualitatively inadequate.
Logistic support—fuel for instance—was not provided, or in minimal
amounts, to the health district. Support was provided at a later stage for the
rehabilitation of buildings, latrines, etc. which had deteriorated with the huge
numbers of refugees.
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Effects of the Relief Intervention on Local Health Districts
Favourable
Some humanitarian aid agencies have built up valuable expertise in dealing
with large-scale emergencies. The health districts learned from the more
experienced agencies such as UNHCR. There was some transfer of resources.
The use of local manpower clearly entailed some transfer of knowledge. The
whole area benefited from the very efficient communication network which was
set up, although the health district never got direct access to it!
Unfavourable
Prices of consumer goods as well as wages increased sharply in the area. The
free provision of health care for refugees—even outside the camps—seriously
endangered the self-financing capacity of the local health services and caused
frustration and discouragement among the Zairean population. The 'hijacking'
of—frequently the most skilled—personnel working in the local health system,
at all levels, further destabilized the already struggling health services. In
addition to the diversion of personnel, some local relief agencies (e.g.
orphanages) were diverted from their original local objectives, leaving Zairean
at-risk groups unprovided for.
However, much more fundamental than the question of financial and
material support, was the inadequate dialogue, coordination and collaboration
between the humanitarian aid agencies and the local health services. The
objectives and strategies of the aid agencies and the local health services
sometimes diverged completely; intensive collaboration and coordination is
required to avoid chaotic situations. Humanitarian aid was limited solely to
refugees, implying refusal to recognize the distress of the Zairean population;
this is painful for anybody who knows their precarious circumstances and the
causes and mechanisms of the crisis in Central Africa. This led to
discouragement and withdrawal of the local authorities, due also to the
humanitarian aid agencies' disregard of them.
The lack of preparedness for the emergency clearly played an important role
in the failure of coordination. More significant, however, were the different
mindset, the different logic, and the different objectives and strategies of both
systems. Despite the common aim of helping the victims, the primary objectives
of the local health services and the humanitarian aid agencies differed widely.
The rural health districts of eastern Kivu are looking for long-term integrated
development, taking into account experience gained over the years, educating
the population and staff members, stimulating self-reliance, slowly building up
a coherent system aimed at becoming self-supporting, proactive and cost
effective.
In contrast, humanitarian aid is not fundamentally concerned with causes
and mechanisms, but requires 'marketable words and images' (Editorial 1995).
Humanitarian aid is not concerned with future developments, once it can
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retire. It is remarkable that the local health system is cited only once (Van
Damme 1995) in all the studies consulted on the Rwandan emergency.
Proposals to Improve Collaboration between the Local Health System
and the Humanitarian Aid Agencies
The interaction between developmental and emergency aid organizations can
be broken down into four stages: communication, coordination, collaboration
and finally integration. The intensity of this interaction, in the end, determines
the efficiency of the respective interventions. Lack of knowledge and of
reciprocal consideration, slowness of communication, the difficulty of installing
coordination between various actors are different aspects which need to be
analysed. Global evaluation of the various activities, which is an absolute
prerequisite for efficient crisis management, remains a very complex subject.
This evaluation is clearly an integral part of the planning of any public health
intervention, and is also necessary for fund-raising. The diversity of the
objectives, the type of interventions, and the methodologies, very much
complicate these procedures.
Another difficulty is the limited adaptability—both in quality and quantity—
of the health services. This adaptability is conditioned by the efficiency of the
health system and its preparedness for the emergency. The latter is extremely
difficult to develop because no funding is available for that type of activity.
Procedures for funding and provision of logistic support to the health services
are extremely slow; this is particularly the case when objectives need to be
adapted and activities modified, even if these modifications are urgently
dictated by changing local realities.
Furthermore, the conjunction of 'wild recruitment' of local personnel with
the free health services provided by emergency aid greatly undermined the local
health system, which frequently lost its most dynamic employees and faced the
impossibility of further self-financing, precisely when its absorption capacity
was strained to the utmost.
Finally, the handover from emergency to developmental aid organizations,
when the crisis is stabilizing, remains a major problem. Preparation of the
transfer of responsibilities is a long and dynamic process, requiring very close
coordination.
The following proposals could be considered.
The risk of the development of emergency situations needs to be evaluated
by the local health system as well as by the humanitarian aid agencies. Health
information and monitoring systems, as well as early warning systems, need to
be reinforced or implemented. The validity, sensitivity and specificity of these
systems need to be evaluated.
A special team should be set up, perhaps under UNHCR auspices, including
representatives of the local administration and health authority. Ideally, the
coordinating team should meet before the disaster, making use of the
information gathered by the local health system and its own knowledge of
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the intervention procedures in case of emergency. This team should guarantee
that the fundamental principles of maximizing impact, consistency and fair
play are respected. It should, for instance, be forbidden to hire employees of
the local health system without previous agreement of the local health
authorities; no distinction should be made between direct and secondary
victims of the emergency.
The coordinating team should enable exchange of experience, expert advice
and information, and contribute to improved coordination and integration of
humanitarian aid and the local health services.
A reciprocal information system between humanitarian and developmental
aid organizations, concerning their respective techniques of intervention, needs
to be implemented. The capacity of the local health services needs to be
reinforced, in order to give them more flexibility and to increase their
adaptability in case of changing environment. The coordinating team should
enable a better evaluation of the requirements of the health services, and allow
resources, if necessary, for the acquisition of technical expertise, to train staff,
build up reserves of relief supplies, and develop their logistic capacity.
The philosophy of the health services managed by the humanitarian aid
agencies inside and outside the camps should be harmonized as soon as
possible with the philosophy of the local health system, in order to integrate
both in a coherent partnership.
The collection and circulation of health information, including gathering
and analysis by the health services, as well as background information from the
coordinating body, need to be improved; without background information, the
quality of the collection of health information cannot be guaranteed.
Interventions, their pertinence and efficacy, need to be evaluated, and
evaluation techniques scrutinized.
Finally, the coordinating team could also facilitate the transfer of
responsibilities back from the humanitarian aid agencies to the local health
services, once the emergency is stabilized.
COLAERT, J., GOYENS, Ph. and SCHYNS, Ch. (1978) 'Antigenic Variation of Vibrio El Tor
during an Epidemic in Kivu'. Annala de la Socliti Beige de Midecine Tropicale 58: 357-358.
DELACOLETTE, C , VAN DER STUYFT, P., MOLIMA, IC, DELACOLETTE-LEBHUN, C.
and WERY, M. (1989) 'Etude de la mortalite globale et de la mortalite liee au paludisme dans le
Kivu raontagneux, Zaire', Revue d'Epidemiologie et de Sante Publique 37: 161-166.
DELANGE, F. (1974) Endemic Goitre and Thyroid Function in Central Africa. Basel: S. Karger
(Monographs in Paediatrics, volume 2).
DE MOL, P., BRASSEUR, D., HEMELHOF, W., TSHIMPAKA KALALA, BUTZLER, J.-P.
and VIS, H. L. (1983) 'Enteropathogenic Agent* in Children with Diarrhoea in Rural Zaire'
Lancet i: 516-518.
EDITORIAL (1995) 'Humanitarian Olympics: Solferino to Goma", Lancet 345: 529-530.
GOMA EPIDEMIOLOGY GROUP (1995) 'Public Health Impact of Rwandan Refugee Crisis:
What happened in Goma, Zaire, in July, 19947" Lancet 345: 339-344.
GOYENS, Ptu, GOLSTEIN, J., NSOMBOLA, R, VIS, H. L. and DUMONT, J. E. (1987)
'Selenium Deficiency as a Possible Factor in the Pathogenesis of Myxoedematous Endemic
Cretinism', Ada Endocrinol. (Copenh) 114: 497-502.
IRS-CEMUBAC (1979) 'Symposium sur l'avenir de Penfant dans le Kivu d'altitude', Bukavu.






280 Philippe Goyens et al.
JONES, W. L and EGLJ, R. (1984) Fanning Systems in Africa. The Great Lakes Highlands of
Zaire. Rwanda, and Burundi. Washington: World Bank Technical Paper 27.
PORIGNON, D., NOTERMAN, J.-P., HENNART, Ph. et al. (1995) 'The Role of the Zairean
Health Services in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis', Disasters 19: 356-360.
RIES, AJ^, WELLS, J.G., OLTVOLA, D. et al. (1994) 'Epidemic Shigella dysenteriae type 1 in
Burundi: Panresistance and Implications for Prevention', / . Infect. Dis. 169: 1035-1041.
TONGLET, R., KATULANYA-ISU, CHIABRERA, F., DRAMADC, M. and HENNART, Ph.
(1991) 'Pattern of Attained Growth in 0 to 5 year-old Children from Kivu (Zaire)', Ecology of
Food and Nutrition 26: 215-226.
VAN DAMME, W. (1995) 'Do Refugees belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea',
Lancet 346: 360-362.
VIS, H.L. (1968) 'General and Specific Metabolic Patterns of Marasmic Kwashiorkor in the Kivu
Area', in McCance, R A . and Wkldowson, E.M. (eds.), Calorie Deficiencies and Protein
Deficiencies. London: Churchill Livingstone, pp. 119-134.
(1975) 'Analyse de la situation nutritionelle dans la region des grands lacs d'Afrique Centrale.
L'hnpasse demographique', Revue Tiers Monde XVI, 63: 567-594.
VIS, H. L , POURBAEX, Pit, THILLY, C and VANDERBORGHT, H. (1969) Analyse de la
situation nutritionelle de societes traditionelles de la region du lac Kivu: les Shi et les Havu.
Enquete de consommation alimentaire', Annales de la Sociiti Beige de Midecine Tropicale 49:
353-419.
VIS, H. I~, YOURASSOWSKY, C and VANDERBORGHT, H. (1975) 'A Nutritional Survey in
the Republic of Rwanda", Ann. Mus. Roy. Afr. Centr. Sc. Hum. 87.
WILS, W., CARAEL, M. and TONDEUR, G. (1986) 'Le Kivu montagneux. Surpopulation, sous-
nutrition, erosion du sol (Etude prospective par simulations mathematiques)', Brussels,
Academic Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Memoires in 8°, Nouvelle Scrie, 21 (3).
WORLD BANK (1993) Better Health in Africa. Washington: World Bank Africa Technical
Department, Human Resources and Poverty Division.
The authors thank the DG VIII of the European Commission and the 'Fondation
Universitaire David et Alice Van Buuren' for active support.
 at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam on November 24, 2010
jrs.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
